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Britain at the Constitutional Crossroads 
Bruce Ackerman 
 Parliamentary government, judicial review, popular 
referenda. These are mere labels.  These constitutional 
forms take on very different meanings within different 
constitutional cultures, grounded in different 
historical experiences. Our task is to reflect on the 
distinctive character of British constitutional 
culture, and the particular challenges it confronts in 
the aftermath of the Brexit referendum.  
 To gain perspective, contrast the British path to 
democracy with the path blazed by the American, French, 
and Bolivarian Revolutions of the Enlightenment – and 
repeated, with many variations, ever since. Under this 
scenario, revolutionary outsiders mobilize against the 
existing government at Time one. Many movements are 
crushed at this point, but many others have triumphed 
over the status quo. This sets the stage for the 
revolutionary leadership to win popular consent for a 
Constitution codifying the fundamental principles that 
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inspired the years of collective struggle in the name 
of the People. 
 This classic scenario has played itself out – with 
very different results – over the course of the 
twentieth century. In Europe, the experiences of modern 
France, Italy, and Poland can serve as paradigms. In 
each case, the promoters of new Constitutions used 
referenda as part of their campaign to vindicate their 
new regimes. But this legal form should not be confused 
with the deeper logic that served as the foundation of 
their emerging political cultures. These constitutions  
gained their legitimacy by expressing the ideals 
inspiring the mobilized effort at collective resistance 
against Nazi, Fascist and Soviet oppression. Once the 
revolutionaries rose to power, the used referenda to 
establish that they had not abused their new-found 
authority by framing constitutions which failed to 
express the revolutionary ideals of the movement. But  
this legal form took on cultural meaning only as part 
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of the deeper dynamic from revolutionary challenge to 
to constitutional triumph in the name of We the People. 
 No similar dynamic has propelled Britain down its 
path to constitutional democracy over the past two 
centuries. To be sure, Edmund Burke’s great diatribe 
against the French Revolution has not deterred mass 
movements from repeatedly appealing to the British 
People to revolutionize their system in the name of one 
or another version of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. 
Moreover, the system has sometimes responded to these 
demands in very substantial ways. But these 
transformations haven’t occurred through the 
revolutionary scenario in which movement-outsiders 
sweep away the old political establishment and proclaim 
the coming of a new era by hammering out a new 
Constitution.  
Instead,   pragmatic members of the British 
establishment have played a central role at moments of 
crisis. The Reform Act of 1832 set a crucial precedent. 
Despite their triumph over the French Revolution in 
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1815, the British establishment soon found itself 
confronting wide-ranging popular demands for more  
democracy, greater liberty, and the liberation of all 
humanity from the burden of slavery. Hard-liners, led 
by the Duke of Wellington, were bent on crushing these 
movements, but they were finally outmaneuvered by 
pragmatists like Earl Grey – who used the threat of 
revolutionary upheaval in 1832 to overcome royal 
resistance to the Reform Act, finally convincing King 
William IV to threaten to pack the House of Lords if it 
did not pass the bill.  This opened a path for new 
leaders coming out of the reform movement to enter 
parliament, reinvigorating the pragmatic 
establishment’s claim to legitimate authority.  
The cooptation of “sensible” outsiders into the 
political class hardly marks the decisive end of 
radical critique. To the contrary, many activists  
condemn their former comrades for betraying the 
revolutionary ideals that had formerly united them. 
Nevertheless, the split inevitably weakens radical 
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efforts to build a broad popular base for a more 
sweeping transformation – leaving much unfinished 
business for a future-that-may-never-arrive.   
The pragmatic elitism of 1832 served as a paradigm 
for similar scenarios that generated the Reform Act of 
1867 and the Parliament Act of 1911. As modern courts 
have repeatedly emphasized, these “constitutional 
statutes” serve as the foundation of British democracy. 
Nevertheless, but they lack the ringing statements of 
principle that appear in the revolutionary 
Constitutions. If you restricted yourself to the words 
of the Parliament Act, for example, you would never 
guess they heralded a new era of redistributive 
taxation permitting the construction of the modern 
welfare state. In contrast, the post-war Constitutions 
of France and Italy immediately confront the reader 
with great statements of principle on these matters. 
Instead, the Parliament Act expresses the same spirit 
of pragmatic adaptation that inspired Gray, Disraeli, 
and Asquith. These practitioners of “common sense” 
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recognize that the opponents will sometimes pander to 
the masses with inspiring calls for revolutionary 
change on behalf of one or another ideology. But they 
are quick to condemn them as dangerous demagogues if 
they take these slogans seriously.  
The great mission of British constitutional culture 
is to put a brake on this dynamic. If the public 
momentarily succumbs to Utopian fantasies (a/k/a 
abstract principles), the challenge of responsible 
statesmen is to resist long enough for sanity to return 
so that pragmatic problem-solving can prevail.  
In contrast, political cultures in places like 
France or Italy take a very different view of 
revolutionary appeals to the People.  Since their 
Constitutions are grounded in narratives based on 
earlier acts of collective sacrifice against 
illegitimate regimes, they are alive to the danger that 
the future politicians may repeat history and use their 
power to establish new forms of tyranny.  From this 
perspective, it is only reasonable for the Constitution 
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to provide for popular referenda to as a focus for 
revitalized grass-roots movements to act decisively 
defeat such threats in the name of the People.  
When we turn to Britain, however, the rise of 
popular referenda owes absolutely nothing to this 
revolutionary spirit. Instead, it is the creation of 
no-nonsense politician making short-term decisions 
without any regard to the longer-term consequences of 
his wheeling-and-dealing. The star of this tragi-
comedy, however, is not David Cameron but Harold 
Wilson.  
When Prime Minister Edward Heath triumphantly 
brought home his agreement to join the Common Market in 
1972, he did not think of offering it up for approval 
by the People at a referendum. He presented its 
fundamental terms to parliament as yet another 
constitutional statute in the British tradition. The 
result was a fierce struggle in the House, with Labour 
united against the bill, and a few right-wingers, led 
by Enoch Powell, joining the opposition. Nevertheless, 
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Heath managed to push the measure through by razor-thin 
margins, permitting Britain to join the Community 
before Heath lost his majority in the election of 1974, 
leading to Margaret Thatcher’s ascent to Conservative 
leadership.  
 This put Harold Wilson in a tough spot when he 
became Prime Minister on the basis of a very narrow 
parliamentary majority. Wilson was a leader of the pro-
European wing of his sharply divided party. But to 
maintain Labour unity in the election campaign, he had 
condemned Heath’s deal as insufficiently advantageous, 
and promised to get a better one if he won the 
election. Once in power, he followed through on his 
pledge and returned from Brussels with a new deal that 
wasn’t very different from Heath’s original bargain. 
This forced the Prime Minister to rely on Conservative 
support to push his authorizing legislation through the 
House. With a majority of Labour MPs breaking party 
discipline to oppose the measure, the government was on 
the verge of collapse. 
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None of this took Wilson by surprise – indeed, he 
had already prepared a path that might lead him out of 
the wilderness. Labour’s Election Manifesto committed 
the Party to “give the British people the final say… 
through the ballot box within twelve months of this 
election” on whether Wilson’s New Deal with Brussels 
sufficed to resolve their doubts about Heath’s earlier 
bargain.  
The Labour Manifesto was framed in broad terms, 
allowing Wilson to fulfil his pledge in two different 
ways – either the traditional way of calling yet 
another parliamentary election and making Europe a 
central issue in the campaign, or by enacting a statute 
authorizing a special referendum.  
So far as Wilson was concerned, it would have been 
political suicide to take the traditional course. With 
a majority of Labour MPs opposed to Europe, it would 
have been impossible to present a unified front in a 
parliamentary election, leading to a triumphant 
Thatcherite assault on Social Democracy.  Wilson’s  
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only hope was to lead pro-European Labourites into an 
ad hoc coalition with like-minded Conservatives and 
Liberals to win the referendum, and then call upon his 
Party’s anti-European wing to accept the judgment of 
the People and join together in a united front against 
Thatcher at the next election.  
Given the short-term stakes, Wilson did not 
hesitate. So far as I can tell, the long-term 
constitutional implications of his appeal to popular 
sovereignty played no role in his decision.     
Paradoxically, it was the hard-headed pragmatism 
prized British constitutionalism that would be at the 
root of its undoing. The pragmatic logic that drove 
David Cameron represents a continuation of Wilson’s no-
nonsense short-termism – with the difference that 
Wilson won by a margin of 67 to 33 while Cameron lost 
by 48-52.  
Yet I would hope that the grave crisis in which 
Britain finds itself will will encourage even the most 
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no-nonsense inhabitant of these islands to confront an 
“ideological” question with uncharacteristic 
seriousness:  What precisely is the relationship 
between the principle of popular sovereignty and the 
outcome of a single referendum? 
Prevailing opinion seems to be moving in the 
direction of Nigel Farage – for whom it is obvious that 
a single 52 to 48 vote suffices to establish that the 
People of Great Britain demand Brexit. But this, I 
suggest, is not obvious at all. To the contrary, the 
June 23
rd
 vote is best understood as the beginning, not 
the end, of an intensive period of popular debate and 
decision. While the 48-52 decision does indeed express 
widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo, the 
principle of popular sovereignty requires something 
more – an informed and deliberate choice of a new 
direction for Britain. The conditions for such a choice 
can only arise after parliament authorizes Prime 
Minister May to invoke Article Fifty, and she returns 
in two years’ time with a deal that permits ordinary 
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voters to confront the real meaning of Brexit for their 
country’s political future. Only if they vote their 
approval a second time should their decision be 
considered authoritative. Only then will the referendum  
satisfy two basic preconditions for the legitimate 
exercise of popular sovereignty.  
The first condition requires the referendum to 
express a considered decision by the voters – not 
merely one that is based on contingent inclinations 
expressed at a particular moment in time. In making 
important choices in our personal life --  choosing a 
mate or a job or a home -- we all do our best to expose 
our immediate inclinations to sober second-thought. 
Granted, there are also dangers in dilly-dallying 
forever – but we know that it’s really stupid to take 
the path that seems most attractive at first sight 
without a second look. Sometimes the need to make an 
immediate decision is so pressing that we can’t afford 
the luxury of reflection. But with the exception of 
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some ecstatic existentialists, a leap in the dark 
shouldn’t be a cause for celebration in its own right. 
The same is true in politics. To put my point in 
practical terms, when parliament shortly turns to 
consider the government’s bill triggering Article 
Fifty, it should amend the bill to require a second 
referendum in two years’ time. This will allow for 
hundreds of millions of conversations around the dinner 
table and at the pub and in the office and maybe even 
at the football stadium – at which citizens can test 
their initial impressions to reach considered judgments 
on a matter that will shape their collective political 
destiny for a very long time to come.  
The two-year period will also permit a more 
legitimate decision on a second dimension. To see my 
point, return again to the dilemmas of personal 
decision. Although you may engage in serious reflection 
about a big decision, you may simply be wrong when it 
comes to crucial facts -- perhaps an attractive job 
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offer has hidden down-sides or a potential life-partner 
has is conducting a secret love affair.  
The same is true when it comes to Brexit. If voters 
are given a chance to the ballot-box a second time, 
they will confront Theresa May’s best shot at a soft 
Brexit. While many imponderables will remain, they will 
be in a far better position to understand the stakes 
than they were on June 23.    
To be sure, even this decision will fall short of 
one-or-another ideal picture of informed deliberation. 
A referendum campaign isn’t a philosophy seminar – nor 
should it be. We are dealing with the proper design of 
a constitution for a democracy, not some twenty-first 
century Platonic Republic. Nevertheless, for real-world 
democrats, there is all the difference in the world 
between the wake-up call of June 23
rd
 and the exercise 
in considered judgment that would be delivered by the 
People in 2020 -- supposing that parliament insists 
that it take place. While it is easy to see why Nigel 
Farage refuses to recognize this difference, I find it 
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surprising that Theresa May, and so many other one-time 
Remainers, fail to appreciate that conditions are not 
yet ripe for the British People to give an 
authoritative answer to a question that will shape 
their future for generations to come.  
 Instead, regardless of the forthcoming decision by 
the Supreme Court, the prime minister should not resist 
parliamentary demands for a second referendum, but 
should endorse special steps to assure that voters take 
their responsibilities seriously in making their 
fateful decision.  
In that spirit, I’d like to urge consideration of a 
proposal that Jim Fishkin and I have developed to 
address this very problem. While it may seem 
speculative at first glance, it is in fact based on 25 
years of rigorous social scientific investigation. 
Before discussing key empirical findings, let me simply 
present the basic idea. Our book, Deliberation Day, 
calls for the creation of a new national holiday at 
which citizens are given a day off from work to join 
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their neighbors at local community centers to discuss 
the key issues raised by the coming election.  
Deliberation Day would begin with a familiar sort 
of televised debate between leading spokesman for the 
Yes and No sides on the Brexit issue. After the show, 
local citizens form small groups of fifteen, which 
begin where the televised debate leaves off. Each group 
spends an hour responding to the broadcast by defining 
questions that the national spokesmen left unanswered. 
Everybody then proceeds to a plenary assembly of 400 to 
hear their questions answered by local representatives 
designated by the national Leave and Remain campaigns.   
After lunch, participants repeat the morning 
procedure. By the end of the day, they will have moved 
far beyond the top-down television debate of the 
morning. They will have achieved a bottom-up 
understanding of Brexit’s implications for the nation. 
Discussions begun on Deliberation Day will continue 
during the run-up to Referendum Day, drawing those who 
did not attend into the escalating national dialogue.  
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Deliberation Day isn’t an idle fantasy. It builds 
on more than seventy-five social science experiments, 
conducted throughout the world, in which representative 
groups of citizens have engaged in the give-and-take 
I’ve just described.  Fishkin has been the leading 
force behind these “deliberative polls,” as he calls 
them, and his Stanford Center for Deliberative 
Democracy has organized an impressive research effort  
that has rigorously analyzed polling data. These 
empirical studies consistently demonstrate that 
participants greatly increase their understanding of 
the issues and often change their minds on the best 
course of action. Swings of 10 percentage points or 
more are very common.  
For present purposes, the results of two polls are 
particularly suggestive. In 1995 and 1997, two groups 
of British voters, representative of the country in 
both attitudes and demographics, were invited to 
discuss the future of the country’s relationship to the 
Europe Union. Deliberations proceeded along the lines I 
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described -- with ordinary citizens meeting in small 
groups to prepare for encounters with leading political 
Eruo-skeptics and Euro-advocates, including the up-and-
coming Tony Blair.  On each occasion, participants 
began the proceedings with pro-European sentiment in 
the low-to-middle 40s; on each occasion, deliberation 
changed a lot of minds, and pro-European views rose to 
the high 50s or low 60s by the end of the discussion. 
I don’t suggest that the same this would happen in 
2020. The polls took place a quarter century ago, and  
Deliberation Day might well swing in the opposite 
direction today. Indeed, systematic study of all 
seventy-five deliberative polls shows that there have 
been big shifts to the Right, as well as to the Left, 
on many occasions as citizens gain a better sense of 
how large issues of public policy relate to their core 
values.  My point is simply that these British polls 
suggest that, if parliament took its responsibilities 
seriously, Deliberation Day deserves a serious place in 
the debate over the 2020 referendum.   
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 There is no disguising the fact that Deliberation 
Day would be a major undertaking.But so is the idea of 
popular sovereignty. If it makes sense for ordinary 
citizens, on certain great occasions, to take their own 
political destinies into their own hands, it makes 
sense to give them an opportunity to cast their votes 
in an informed fashion.  
Our book goes on to argue that a country like 
Britain could readily meet the bureaucratic challenges 
involved in organizing Deliberation Day at a reasonable 
cost. But obviously, there are many other reasonable 
ways to design the referendum in an effort to redeem 
the promise of popular sovereignty.  
Only one thing is clear: Britain won’t get there by 
muddling through. 
*** 
 This is, alas, precisely what the May government is 
presently attempting. Rather than inviting a serious 
debate on the meaning of popular sovereignty, the Prime 
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Minister is trying to make an end-run around parliament  
by invoking the royal prerogative to trigger Article 
Fifty of the Lisbon Treaty. Like the rest of you, I 
will be a very interested bystander to the government’s 
effort to defend this maneuver before the Supreme 
Court. I should emphasize, however, that this Lecture 
has been exploring a dimension of the issue which is 
not involved in the litigation.    
Although the Court of Appeals’ judgment rejected 
the government’s claims, it did not do so on the 
grounds that I have been developing. My argument, in a 
nutshell, is that the June 23
rd
 vote cannot be 
considered an authoritative act of popular sovereignty. 
Rather than reflecting on this question, however, the 
Court focused on the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty – insisting that the government’s appeal to 
the royal prerogative represented an unconstitutional 
end-run around the House. As a relatively knowledgeable 
outsider, I was impressed by the Court’s reasoning – 
but I’m very confident that the justices of the Supreme 
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Court don’t need outsiders to help them figure out the 
right answer to this classic question. 
My aim here, however, is to suggest that the 
traditional way in which the Court of Appeal posed its 
question doesn’t do justice to the distinctive 
character of the current crisis. The issue isn’t simply 
parliament versus royal prerogative, but the rise of 
popular sovereignty as a constitutional principle in 
its own right.  
When viewed from this angle, my thesis appears in a 
paradoxical light: Precisely because the notion of 
popular sovereignty is so unfamiliar in British 
constitutional culture, the June 23
rd
 vote has been 
accepted uncritically as an authoritative act of We the 
People by broad swaths of the British political class 
as well as the general public.  
It is here where my outsider perspective might 
prove useful. As an American, I come from a country 
which whose constitution is based on popular, not 
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parliamentary, sovereignty – and we have two centuries 
of experience in working out the practical implications 
of this foundational commitment. If there is anything 
we have learned, it is this: From the election of 
Thomas Jefferson in 1800 to the election of Ronald 
Reagan in 1980, there have been moments when a 
particular voting result served as a major turning 
point, with voters repudiating the status quo, and 
giving their support to leaders who advanced a new 
constitutional vision for America. But this is all it 
accomplished. Although a Franklin Roosevelt or a Ronald 
Reagan might assert that their initial electoral 
victories had granted them mandates for fundamental 
change, such assertions of authority only provoked 
political opposition that framed further electoral 
contests – which gave voters further opportunities to 
confirm, modify, or reject their original proposals for 
transformation in the name of We the People.  
The same is true, I suggest, of parliament’s 
encounter with Brexit. If I am right, my conclusion 
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reinforces the Court of Appeals’ holding. The 
government’s appeal to royal prerogative not only 
assaults a principle of parliamentary sovereignty 
rooted in centuries of British history; but it is 
attempting an end-run around parliament in the name of 
a single referendum that cannot rightly be viewed as an 
authoritative decision by We the People of Great 
Britain.   
As you may have noticed, America is also 
confronting a similar issue. The election of Donald 
Trump, like the referendum of June 23, also signals an 
emphatic, and broad-based, challenge to the status quo. 
But it remains for the next elections to determine 
whether President Trump’s victory represents a flash in 
the pan, or the harbinger of yet another revolutionary 
transformation of foundational principles in the name 
of We the People. 
America and Britain, in short, continue to maintain 
a special relationship. We confront parallel 
constitutional dilemmas – and the way we manage to 
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resolve them will shape the future of the trans-
Atlantic community – and much else besides – for a very 
long time to come.    
 
 
